Fuchs Debate on the Ethics of Stem Cell Research

Following are remarks made by Alan Fuchs, professor of philosophy, during a debate on the ethics of stem-cell research sponsored by Swem Library.

"I would like to make an argument about the morality of several practices: one [is what] we call reproductive cloning, where we take a nucleus and plant it in an egg cell, then plant it in a mother and grow a fraternal twin from the donor’s cell. This is not a morally desirable practice, at least under the present circumstances. I will, however, suggest that that does not necessarily make it something which we should legally prohibit—that we may not reason simply from the perceived morality of a practice to the question of whether or not it should be legally prohibited. With regard to so-called therapeutic cloning, the use of embryonic stem cells, I will argue that this not only is a moral practice but that it also might be—as Congressman Santos said recently on “The West Wing”—morally obligatory for us to engage. Finally, I want to raise a question about the questions we’re asking: How we are to go about answering them, particularly the matters of using certain kinds of religious perspectives as a means of answering these controversial ethical issues? I will argue that is not appropriate insofar as we, as a multicultural, pluralistic, democratic, constitutional society, have certain forms of reasoning that we must adhere to, and the use of possibly sectarian perspectives is not appropriate use of those forms [...]

We start off as one-celled things, two-celled things, four-celled things, and gradually we start to look like tadpoles, and start differentiating arms and legs, then a heartbeat comes in a few weeks, and then we get brain activity and start to look more and more like persons. This process extends through birth and even into development. So what is going on here? When did that become a person? My response is that it is a gradual process. Very early on there is only a distant resemblance, a basis, a potentiality, but very little of a person. Over time, this becomes greater and greater. And, insofar as we think our moral rights are dependent upon being a person, the degree of moral sanctity of this entity likewise grows with time."

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